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CURRENT THREATS TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND APPROPRIATE
RESPONSES: A PRESENTATION TO THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION*
HONORABLE JOHN M. WALKER, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission,
it is a privilege for me to appear before you today on behalf of the
more than 700 active and senior Article III judges who belong to
the Federal Judges Association ("FJA"). I am the Association's
Immediate Past President and have served as a circuit judge on
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for seven years. Previously, I
served for four years as a district judge on the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York. Relevant to this
inquiry, I am also a member of the Budget Committee of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States and am a director and faculty
member of the Institute of Judicial Administration, a private non-
profit agency based in New York.
The FJA is a voluntary, non-profit association. Its purpose, as
set forth in its constitution, is "to seek the highest quality of jus-
tice for the people of the United States."' The FJA's primary objec-
tives in fulfilling this mission are twofold: First, to preserve the
ability of the federal judiciary to attract and retain the best quali-
fied men and women for judicial service, and, second, to protect
and defend the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the
judiciary from intrusion, intimidation, coercion, or domination
from any source. 2
* Remarks of the Hon. John M. Walker, Jr. Before the American Bar Association
Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence December 13, 1996,
Washington, D.C.
** Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1 THE FEDERAL JUDGES AsSOCIATION CONsTrrurION: A DECADE OF ACHIEVEMENT, 1982-
1992 39, app. 2 (Carole Hicke ed., 1993).
2 See id.
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On behalf of the membership of the FJA, I wish to congratulate
the American Bar Association ("ABA") and its president, Lee
Cooper, for appointing this distinguished Commission on Separa-
tion of Powers and Judicial Independence and for conducting com-
prehensive hearings into these important matters. The ABA per-
forms its most vital role in advancing the administration of justice
when it conducts an important study of this sort. The FJA is
pleased to contribute what it can to the Commission's efforts, and
I hope that my remarks will be useful to the work of the
Commission.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The framers of our Constitution were keenly aware that it was
essential to the national well being, and indeed to the ability of
our republican form of government to endure, that the judiciary
operate completely independent of political control or influence.3
It is every bit as true today as it was more than 200 years ago that
for our government to function effectively and for essential free-
doms to be preserved, federal judges must do their job in an at-
mosphere that is absolutely free of any sense that a particular de-
cision will invite personal retaliation or retribution. When judges
take office they forswear political affiliation or activity. The
judge's allegiance is not to any political agenda or popular current
of social thought, but-consistent with the oath of office-to the
rigorous neutral application of principles of law derived from the
Constitution, statutes, and, where appropriate, the common law.
As Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated in his lecture
series on the nature of the judicial process, a judge is:
not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure .... He is
to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not
to yield to .. .sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevo-
lence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social
life. 4
3 See Dean John D. Feericks, Judicial Independence and the Impartial Administration of
Justice, 51 REC. N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N 231 (1996) (providing brief historical summary ofjudicial
independence).
4 Id. at 239 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141
(1921) (internal quotations omitted)).
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If a judge then is to interpret and follow the law without regard to
his or her personal policy preferences, the judge must feel com-
pletely at liberty to do so and must never feel exposed to potential
retaliation for unpopular decisions.
Government according to the rule of law is a precious, indeed
priceless, commodity; it is also a fragile one. It was established by
our forefathers in response to the English experience.5 Through-
out periods of English history, judges were not free of political con-
trol, but rather owed their allegiance to the King. Indeed, the
constitutional history of England is unhappily tarnished by exam-
ples of judges being removed from office because of the King's dis-
pleasure with their decisions. Henry VII is said to have boasted
that he ruled England with his laws and his laws with his judges.7
In Colonial America, part of the political reality that led to the
stirrings of rebellion was the dependence of judicial tenure and
compensation upon the wishes of the English monarch.' As the
struggle for independence and later a constitutional form of gov-
ernment grew, the idea of the indispensability of an independent
judiciary was always a vital ingredient. The idea appeared in the
Declaration of Independence wherein, its signatories listed griev-
ances against the Crown, including that the King "has obstructed
the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for
establishing Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges dependent on
his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries."9 Consistent with these grievances, an
independent judiciary was a common theme in the constitutions of
the newly formed states and the tenure and compensation of
judges was secured toward that end.' °
At the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787, the
need for an independent judiciary was equally apparent, and Arti-
cle III was drafted to provide for life tenure for judges, for judicial
salaries that could not be diminished during a judge's term in of-
fice and for service during good behavior, which meant removal
5 See id. at 236-37.
6 See id. at 236.
7 See id. (citing EvAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 54-55 (1944)).
8 See id.
9 Id. at 237 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 10-11 (U.S. 1776)).
10 See id.
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from office only upon impeachment and conviction." James
Madison, one of the Constitution's principal architects, articulated
the critical concept that the government rest upon three pillars,
legislative, executive, and judicial; that these co-equal branches be
separate and independent; and that each branch operate as a
check and balance, one to the other. 2 The judiciary's place as the
third co-ordinate, co-equal, but separate, branch of government
was anchored in Article III of the Constitution.'
3
The founding fathers believed the judiciary to be the least dan-
gerous branch, that is to say the least likely to tyrannize or op-
press the people, because it had neither the sword of the executive
nor the purse of the legislature; it was, as Federalist No. 78
stated, possessed of "neither force nor will but merely judg-
ment."' 4 Federalist No. 78 went on to point out that in this weaker
position, the judiciary "is in continual jeopardy of being overpow-
ered or influenced by its coordinate branches" and that since
"nothing can contribute so much to [the judiciary's] firmness and
independence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore
be solely regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its Constitu-
tion and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice
and public security."' 5 Today, more than 200 years after the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, the need for judicial independence is no
less real as it was then.
This country asks a great deal of its federal judges. It was once
noted by Alexis de Tocqueville, the French statesman and histo-
rian, that "scarcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial ques-
11 See U.S. CONST. art. III (providing that "judges, both of the Supreme and Inferior
Courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior.. ."). See generally JOHN FINE, LEC-
TURES ON LAw 39-40 (1852) (explaining that salaries of United States Supreme Court
judges cannot be lessened while in office and that removal of judges can only be effected
through impeachment); DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES-IT'S
HISTORY, APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1050 (1910) (noting that sentiment of constitu-
tional convention favored establishment of federal judiciary endowed with full judicial
power).
12 See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS Nos. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press
1945).
13 See U.S. CONST. art. III (stating that "[tihe judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish").
14 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 79, at 520 (Alexander Hamilton).
15 Id. at 521.
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tion."' 6 Judges today must decide countless questions under the
Constitution and statutory law: They must frequently apply broad
principles under these laws and at other times resolve ambiguities
and reconcile conflicting terms and provisions. Our courts are
called upon to ensure against governmental intrusion of all sorts
of rights and liberties of the people contained in the text of the
Constitution and its Bill of Rights; indeed, one is hard-pressed to
name a field of human endeavor that does not engender legal dis-
putes and controversies which judges must resolve. 17
At the federal level, it is the promise then of Article III that
judges who must decide the myriad cases before them do so with-
out fear of adverse personal consequences. Only in this way can
the nation do its best to ensure that the decisions of courts are
rendered without bias or partiality and according to law.
II. CURRENT THREATS TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
I regret to say that today questions arise as to whether the
promise of Article III is being completely met. Judges recently
have been subject to personal attacks, transcending legitimate
criticism, for making unpopular decisions. I will discuss this sub-
ject in a moment. But there is another potential encroachment on
judicial independence that comes from the co-equal branches, just
as Federalist No. 78 predicted. These actions of the legislature
and the executive of which I will speak have been undertaken, I
hasten to add, without malevolent purpose or deliberate intent to
weaken the judiciary, but they can, and do, have unfortunate and
unintended consequences. It is this systemic concern that is the
primary occupation of the FJA about which I will devote the ma-
jority of my remarks. I wish to begin, however, with some brief
comments on the criticism of judges.
A. Criticism of Judges
During the past political season, candidates from both parties,
indeed from both political branches, sought to obtain political ad-
vantage from particular decisions rendered by Article III judges.
A judge from the District Court for the Southern District of New
16 Feerick, supra note 3, at 239 (quoting 1 ALEXiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 290 (1945)).
17 See id.
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York, Judge Harold Baer, Jr., was singled out for censure during
the campaign season by local, state, and national political figures
alike, including both the White House and the President's oppo-
nent in the general election. The attacks focused on the judge's
decision to suppress evidence pursuant to the Fourth Amendment
in a criminal case.18 Judge Baer, although new to the federal
bench, had earned a solid reputation as a respected state court
jurist. Whatever the merits of Judge Baer's decision-and of
course I can express no opinion on that subject-the criticism of
Judge Baer was unique, at least in this decade, for both its ad
hominem nature and its apparent attempt to influence the out-
come of a pending proceeding. In fact, the White House, at one
point, implied that it might call for his resignation were Judge
Baer not to alter his decision.' 9 The opposition candidate went one
step further suggesting impeachment as a proper avenue.2 °
Although this incident was the most conspicuous example of
political criticism of judges that crossed the line of propriety and
stood as a clear threat to judicial independence, it was not alone.
Short of calling for resignations, other Article III judges have been
singled out on the basis of results of decisions rendered in their
official capacity.2 ' One Circuit Judge even publicly stated that he
was resigning rather than serve as a "prime target" in a political
season.2 In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, counsel
for the White House intimated that should the particular deci-
sions of any judges appointed by the current administration, or
Democratic administrations generally, become campaign issues
there were ample decisions rendered by judges appointed during
prior Republican administrations to serve as grist for the political
mill. 23
I offer these introductory examples not to suggest that discus-
sion, indeed forceful criticism, of particular decisions of particular
18 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Judges as Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 1996, at
Al.
19 See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. Tims, March 22,
1996, at Al.
20 See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, Dole Tours Death Chamber in San Quentin and Calls
for Speedier Executions, N.Y. TimEs, March 24, 1996, at Al.
21 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S2790-801 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1996).
22 See Henry J. Reske, Judge Blasts Politicization of Judiciary, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at
40.
23 See Jack Quinn, Let's Play 'Whose Judges Are Tougher on Crime', WALL ST. J., Mar.
27, 1996, at A23.
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courts is somehow intrinsically inappropriate. This is far from the
case. As Judge William Henry Hastie has observed "principled
criticism serves as an invaluable corrective of otherwise unreal-
ized error."24 I, and all other judges, benefit from thoughtful criti-
cism of those taking issue with the reasoning or unstated assump-
tions of our opinions. Indeed, the appellate process is grounded in
thoughtful criticism. Nor, of course, do I suggest that personal or
partisan criticism is somehow outside our tradition of freedom of
expression. But when criticism reaches the level of intimidation
and attempts to affect the outcome of a particular case or of future
cases of like kind before a particular judge, judicial independence
is imperiled.
Although Federal judges receive shelter from the political winds
by the structural protections of Article III, judges are human and,
thus, perhaps depending on the thickness of a judge's skin, are not
invulnerable to the influence of political pressure. To rely on con-
stitutional protections alone is not enough. District Judge Wil-
liam Hoeveler-a judge who has presided over controversial cases
challenging the constitutionality of correctional practices in sev-
eral southern Florida counties as well as the trial of former Pana-
manian strongman Manuel Noriega-has commented: "Even
though we have life tenure, we're human; don't ever think we're
not subject to outside pressures. The press, public approval, polls,
there are a variety of forces that invade our thinking or at least
try to invade our thinking."25 Judge Hoeveler's observation recog-
nizes the reality that even a thick skin and willingness to listen to
criticism may, for some, be insufficient protection in the face of
personal, reflexive, unprincipled attacks.
Equally important, however, such inappropriate criticism im-
perils the standing of the judiciary in the public eye, a matter es-
sential to the day-to-day functioning of the courts. Without public
confidence in the judiciary-lacking as it does ultimate coercive
power-the respect accorded its judgments will erode. The need
24 William H. Hastie, Judicial Role and Judicial Image, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 947, 951
(1973) (quoted in Louis H. Pollack, Criticizing Judges, 79 JUDICATURE 229, 229 (1996)).
25 What is Judicial Independence?: Views from the Public, the Press, the Profession, and
the Politicians, 80 JUDICATURE 73 (1996) (edited transcript of panel discussion at American
Judicature Society's 1996 annual meeting).
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for deference to the courts is widely acknowledged26 and examples
of concern for its potential erosion abound, one of the most power-
ful being the Supreme Court's unprecedented nine-Justice joint
opinion in Cooper v. Aaron27 turning aside a state's challenge to
the enforcement of Brown v. Board of Education.28 Personal and
unprincipled attacks on judges sap the strength of the entire
judiciary.
Policing the line between appropriate criticism of particular de-
cisions and those assaults that erode judicial independence should
not be a matter for legislation but for good sense. Given the con-
straints-appropriate ones at that-placed on judges' public pro-
nouncements as to pending cases, 29 however, judges must of ne-
cessity rely on the bar-in particular such organizations as the
ABA-the academy, and more generally the public to pay close
attention to the line between criticism that is proper and criticism
that is inappropriate and join issue when the line is crossed. The
line, I might add, is not a particularly difficult one to draw. Ap-
propriate criticism would include pointing out defective reasoning,
misapplication of the law to the facts, and a judge's clear depar-
ture from the law to effect personal policy preferences. Criticism
goes too far when it consists of personalized attacks that are fo-
cused simply on the result of the judge's decision without consider-
ation of its legal reasoning or of the facts of the case, or attacks
that call for a judge's resignation or removal from office on the
basis of rulings in a particular case. °
B. Systemic Threats to Judicial Independence
In addition to such overt-publicly accessible-manifestations
of peril to judicial independence, other less publicly noticeable but
equally troubling hazards are endemic in the framework of our
divided national government. The necessary reliance by the judi-
ciary on the political branches of the government for its suste-
26 See generally Joseph Vining, Authority and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Def
erence, 43 ADMiN. L. REV. 135, 146 (1990) (stating deference to courts is implied in phrase
"the force of law").
27 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
28 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(9) (1990).
30 See Feerick, supra note 3, at 243.
[Vol. 12:45
CURRENT THREATS
nance creates the potential for a weakening of the judiciary as an
institution."
The FJA over the last several years has endeavored to point out
the need for vigilance in the relationship between the judiciary
and the political branches. Particular attention should be directed
to the process of according just compensation to judges and the
operation of the budgetary process.
Fully acknowledging the constitutional and statutory obliga-
tions of the political branches in budgetary matters-particularly
in these times of fiscal austerity-there is certainly a zone of ap-
propriate budgetary control and supervision of the judiciary. We
believe, however, that zone should be no greater than necessary to
enable Congress to perform its proper budgetary role. In perform-
ing its budgetary responsibilities, Congress should never be con-
cerned with the results of judicial decisions. We also question
whether this role requires Congress to micro-manage the business
of the federal courts. We are also troubled by the failure of Con-
gress to exempt the judiciary from the scope of the line item veto
and by recurrent efforts of the executive to exercise control over
the judiciary's budget. And, of course, we are distressed over the
repeated failure of Congress to provide simple cost-of-living ad-
justments to federal judges.
The FJA has consistently worked to protect judicial salaries
from reductions in pay resulting from inflation. Concern about
the effect of inflation on judicial salaries can be traced back to the
development of the Constitution. The issue was discussed at the
Constitutional Convention and, as a result, the Constitution gives
Congress the power to raise judicial salaries.3 2 Hamilton ex-
plained in Federalist No. 79 that "[i]t will be readily understood
that the fluctuations in the value of money and in the state of soci-
ety render a fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution
inadmissible."33
31 See generally LAWRENCE A. TRIBE; AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW §§ 3-5 (1988) (not-
ing federal courts' dependence upon Congress due to inability to use power to review consti-
tutionality of government action unless Congress first authorizes federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction); Joseph H. Rodriquez, New Threatsto Judicial Independence, 35 JUDGES J. 24,
24 (1996) (describing Congress' challenge ofjudiciary's lawmaking independence as result
of former's authority to prescribe procedural as well as substantive rules for federal courts).
32 See U.S. CONST. art. HI.
33 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Whether or not the prohibition in Article III against diminish-
ing judicial pay contained in the Compensation Clause explicitly
applies to cuts in real pay resulting from inflation, the principle of
judicial independence that gave rise to the Compensation Clause's
prohibition on pay reductions applies with equal force to pay re-
ductions due to inflation. There can be no doubt that the reduc-
tion in purchasing power resulting from inflation is a real pay cut.
Congress recognizes this, as evidenced by its grant of cost-of-living
adjustments to almost all federal officers and the indexing of vari-
ous benefits to inflation. Congress, however, in each of the last
four years has refused to provide for cost-of-living adjustments for
federal judges because it refused to adjust its own salary to reflect
the increased cost-of-living. And it has done so despite the provi-
sions of the 1989 Ethics Reform Act that were specifically in-
tended to provide for automatic cost-of-living adjustments every
year. Yet, at the same time, every other career federal officer in
the general schedule has received appropriate cost-of-living in-
creases designed to keep real pay even with inflation. As a result,
the judges have unfairly experienced a real pay loss in four years,
while nearly all other federal officers, including nearly all employ-
ees of the judicial branch, have received wage increases between
eight and sixteen percent. The regular denial of the small cost-of-
living adjustments creates the need for large "catch-up" adjust-
ments in pay, like the one enacted in 1989. These large adjust-
ments are politically difficult to accomplish and inappropriately
thrust the judiciary into an awkward political controversy.
Congress has denied these adjustments notwithstanding the in-
tense efforts of the FJA to de-link the pay of Congress and judges.
Specifically, the Association has sought legislation de-linking
judges' pay from that of Congress and repealing the so-called Sec-
tion 140, 34 enacted in 1981, which requires that, unlike any other
government officeholder, judges may not receive even an auto-
matic upward adjustment, cost-of-living or otherwise, absent a
specific affirmative act of Congress.35
The FJA opposes the reduction in real pay resulting from the
denial of the adjustments because it affects the ability to attract
the most qualified men and women to judicial office and keep them
34 Pub. L. No. 97-92, § 140, 95 Stat. 1183, 1200 (1981).
35 Id.
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there. 6 The job is one to which, we hope, concerned and public
spirited persons should aspire and to which they are willing to
devote their whole lives. The denial of cost-of-living adjustments
to the judiciary inevitably leads to increased resignations from the
bench, as occurred in the 1970's and early 1980's. 7
It also leads to the unseemly practice of judges having to im-
plore Congress to restore fair compensation at the same time
those same judges are sitting in review of congressional enact-
ments and of judges seeking the support in this regard of the Ex-
ecutive Branch, which also happens to be the principal litigant in
the federal courts. Denial of cost-of-living adjustments is also un-
fair. The judiciary is unlike the other political branches. Those
who serve in Congress or as top officials in the Executive Branch
are elected or appointed for discrete terms of office. Judges, how-
ever, make a lifetime commitment to become impartial decision-
makers who, quite rightly, are removed from the political process.
We believe that judges, who have chosen this career in govern-
ment, are entitled to no worse treatment than other career federal
employees.
The issue of these cost-of-living adjustments is not simply one of
compensation. I hope I have convinced you that it lies at the heart
of an independent judiciary, which, as recognized in the Constitu-
tion, should not be in a subservient position to other branches of
government, and must maintain the confidence and respect of the
American people.
The FJA is also deeply concerned about the general process for
reviewing the salaries of all top federal officials, including judges.
Prior to the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,38 the authority and re-
sponsibility for reviewing quadrennially the salaries of top offi-
cials of the three branches and for seeking pay parity with the
private sector was vested in the Commission on Executive, Legis-
lative, and Judicial Salaries, popularly known as the Quadrennial
36 See William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 19 AM. J.
TRiAL ADvoc. 491, 493-94 (1996) (stating "[ulnless a solution is found to deal adequately
with the issue of judicial salary erosion, it will be difficult to attract outstanding lawyers to
the bench and retain them").
37 See, e.g., Judith Haverman, Panel May Urge Big Rise in Top U.S. Officials' Pay, WASH.
POST, Dec. 11, 1986, at Al (referring to federal commission fact sheet stating "resignations
of judges are at their highest level with 'inadequate compensation' stated as the prime
reason").
38 Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989).
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Commission. The recommendations of the Quadrennial Commis-
sion were reviewed by the President and his recommendations to
the Congress became law without the need for further congres-
sional action.39
Under the Ethics Reform Act these responsibilities were trans-
ferred to a Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensa-
tion.40 Under the law, the first Citizens' Commission was to be
appointed in 1993.41 This Commission has been a political non-
starter. Apart from the fact that five of the eleven members of the
Citizens' Commission must "be chosen by lot from among names
randomly selected from voter registration lists," 42 the Ethics Re-
form Act required that any recommended pay increases be ap-
proved by a recorded congressional vote.43 The Commission has
never been fully appointed and all funding has been denied by
Congress.4 The lack of any functioning system for reviewing sala-
ries and recommending appropriate salary levels deepens our con-
cern about maintaining the quality and independence of the fed-
eral judiciary.
Formulation of the judiciary's budget is also an area where the
political branches must responsibly exercise their power. The
Constitution creates a delicate balance between the political
branches and the judiciary. The Constitution gives Congress the
power to make appropriations and exercise oversight over expend-
itures. The President has the power to sign or veto budgets
passed by Congress. Consistent with the system of checks and
balances set forth in the Constitution, the political branches have
oversight over the judiciary's budget requests. The judiciary's
budget requests are subject to full review by the congressional ap-
propriations committees. It is the legitimate prerogative of Con-
gress to exercise oversight over the judiciary's expenditure of
funds.
39 See The Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat. 613, amended by Pub.
L. No. 95-19, 91 Stat. 39, 45 (1977), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-190, 99 Stat. 1185, 1322
(1985). The first amendment mandated affirmative approval by Congress of the President's
salary recommendations before an increase could take effect, but this was modified in 1985
with the restoration of congressional action only when it disapproved of the President's
recommendations. Id.; see also Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 215 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
40 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-64 (1994).
41 2 U.S.C. § 352(8)(A) (1994).
42 2 U.S.C. § 352(4)(B) (1994).
43 2 U.S.C. § 359(2)(A) (1994).
44 See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-123, 107 Stat. 1226, 1239 (1993) (eliminating funding).
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Congress has acted in the past to preserve judicial indepen-
dence in the area of appropriations. A provision in the Budget and
Accounting Act provides that the proposed appropriations for the
judicial branch shall be submitted to the President and included
in the budget transmitted by him to Congress "without change."45
This provision, when obeyed, serves to place appropriations re-
quests outside the control or influence of the Executive Branch's
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). Unfortunately, in re-
cent years OMB has had to be reminded on more than one occa-
sion of this provision of law, and the President has even been
called upon to intervene on the judiciary's behalf. That the Presi-
dent has always been willing to do so is a testament to the Presi-
dent's sensitivity to the need for judicial independence.
We are concerned, however, that the recent line-item veto legis-
lation4 6 could upset the delicate balance created by our Constitu-
tion. Under the new law, almost all of the judiciary's appropria-
tions are subject to a line-item veto by the President. As the Chief
Judge of the Sixth Circuit Gilbert S. Merritt testified before Con-
gress, in support of an exemption of the judiciary from the line-
item veto, "[ilt requires little imagination to see how a threat to
judicial independence could come from undue financial pressures
by the Executive Branch."47 This is especially so because, as noted
earlier, the United States, and in particular the Executive Branch,
is the most frequent litigant in the federal courts.48
CONCLUSION
The legacy of judicial independence, left to us by the founders, is
among the most precious political and social assets of our demo-
cratic system. Like any legacy, however, it must be valued and
protected. Although, in large measure, the judiciary has success-
fully withstood challenges over the years, without vigilance there
is no guarantee that it will continue to thrive. Whether the
45 See 31 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (1994).
46 See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
47 Statement Before the Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs and the House Comm. on
Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. (1995) available in 1995 WL 10418 (state-
ment of Gilbert S. Merritt, Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit and Chairman of the Executive
Comm. of the Judicial Conference of the United States).
48 See generally Jean Christensen, Federal Judges Oppose Line-Item Veto, Assoc. PREss,
Mar. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4418359 (noting that since executive branch is most
frequent litigant in federal courts, it should not decide budgetary issues ofjudicial branch).
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threats emanate from heated political discourse or from our sys-
tem of divided government, the public and the organized bar, as
well as elected officials, must be alert to the dangers and must-as
a matter not only of civic duty but also, in the long run, of sheer
self-interest-take whatever steps are necessary to preserve one
of the most valued, and envied, aspects of our government.
